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Abstract
Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went
into effect in May 2018, online services are required to ob-
tain users’ explicit consent before sharing users’ personal
data with third parties that use the data for their own purposes.
While violations of this legal basis on the Web have been stud-
ied in-depth, the community lacks insight into such violations
in the mobile ecosystem.
We perform the first large-scale measurement on Android
apps in the wild to understand the current state of the vio-
lation of GDPR’s explicit consent. Specifically, we build a
semi-automated pipeline to detect data sent out to the Internet
without prior consent and apply it to a set of 86,163 Android
apps. Based on the domains that receive data protected under
the GDPR without prior consent, we collaborate with a legal
scholar to assess if these contacted domains are third-party
data controllers. Doing so, we find 24,838 apps send personal
data towards data controllers without the user’s explicit prior
consent. To understand the reasons behind this, we run a noti-
fication campaign to inform affected developers and gather
insights from their responses. We then conduct an in-depth
analysis of violating apps as well as the corresponding third
parties’ documentation and privacy policies. Based on the
responses and our analysis of available documentation, we de-
rive concrete recommendations for all involved entities in the
ecosystem to allow data subjects to exercise their fundamental
rights and freedoms.
1 Introduction
Increasing data collection and tracking consumers by today’s
online advertising industry is becoming a major problem for
individuals’ rights regarding their personal data (e.g., users
are secretly tracked and profiled [29, 43, 45]). To protect user
privacy, regulatory efforts around the globe such as the Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) have been made in recent
years [14, 54] — which mandate online services to disclose
transparently how they handle personal data and grant users
crucial data protection rights.
In mobile apps, researchers have analyzed the app privacy
policies to identify legislation violations, i.e., determining
whether an app’s behavior is consistent with what is declared
in the privacy policy [4, 56, 58, 72, 73]. However, irrespec-
tive of a privacy policy, under the GDPR [54], to be legally
compliant, an app is required to obtain users’ explicit con-
sent before sharing personal data with third parties if such
parties use the data for their own purposes (e.g., personal-
ized advertising) [21]. The GDPR requires the consent to
be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous (Sec-
tion 2.2). That is, personal data transfer must only occur after
the user has actively agreed (e.g., by clicking accept), i.e.,
“consent” packaged in terms and conditions or privacy poli-
cies is not compliant [29].
While many researchers have worked to detect and analyze
consent notices (i.e., cookie banners) and their impact on the
Web advertising and tracking industry after the GDPR went
into effect [17, 37, 43, 57, 61, 62, 65], the community lacks
insight into such violations in the mobile ecosystem. Recently,
Weir et al. [69] surveyed app developers and observed that
most developers’ changes were cosmetic due to the GDPR
legislation (e.g., adding dialogues) — which raises a serious
question about whether these changes fulfill the legal condi-
tions for collecting valid consents. Figure 1 shows examples
of consent dialogues that mobile users in the European Union
observe on many apps they use today. Notably, neither (a) nor
(b) are valid consent dialogues required before data sharing
with third parties, and even dialogue (c) is meaningless if data
sharing occurs before the user has the ability to reject this.
To understand how prevalent violations of GDPR’s ex-
plicit consent requirement are in the wild, we conduct a study
with 86,613 Android apps available through the German Play
Store, allowing us to provide a comprehensive overview of
the current state of the violation of GDPR’s explicit consent
on mobile apps in the wild. Specifically, we first build a semi-
automated and scalable pipeline to detect personal data sent
to the Internet by analyzing the network traffic generated
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Example of consent dialogues in Android apps.
by apps without user explicit prior consent and apply this to
our dataset, which consists of both high-profile and long-tail
apps. Based on the domains that receive data protected under
the GDPR without prior consent, we collaborate with a legal
scholar to assess the extent to which contacted domains are
third-party data controllers — which require explicit consent.
Doing so, we find 24,838 apps sent personal data towards
advertisement providers that act as data controllers without
the user’s explicit prior consent. To inform developers about
these issues and understand the reasons behind them, we run
a notification campaign to contact 11,914 affected developers
and gather insights from 448 responses to our notifications.
Inspired by the responses, we conduct an in-depth analysis
of available documentation and default data collection set-
tings of third-party SDKs. Based on the insights from both
developers and our own analysis, we find that GDPR issues
are widespread, often misunderstood, and require effort from
advertisement providers, app stores, and developers alike to
mitigate the problems. In summary, our paper makes the fol-
lowing contributions:
• We build a semi-automated and scalable solution (which
is publicly available at [1]) to detect personal data sent
to the Internet by analyzing the network traffic generated
by apps without user explicit prior consent (Section 3).
• We perform a large-scale measurement on the mobile
apps in the wild to understand the current state of the
violation of GDPR’s explicit consent (Section 4).
• We run a notification campaign to inform affected devel-
opers and gather insights from their responses. We then
conduct an in-depth analysis of violating apps and the
corresponding third parties’ documentation (Section 5).
• We derive concrete recommendations to all concerned
parties and make an urgent call to help developers com-
ply with GDPR (Section 6).
2 Research Questions and Legal Background
Our work focuses on the violation of GDPR’s explicit consent
requirement in the realm of Android apps available through
the European Play Store (i.e., from Germany). In the follow-
ing, we briefly outline prior work in the area of GDPR and
related privacy legislation, as well as more general privacy
analyses for mobile apps. We subsequently present the legal
background on GDPR and present our research questions.
2.1 Context of our Work
In recent years, many researchers have started to study the
impact of GDPR on the online advertising and tracking in-
dustry and proposed different techniques to detect legislation
violations. A related line of work aims to study the consent
notices in the Web ecosystem, which are usually presented in
cookie banners. Researchers have shown that many websites
potentially violate the GDPR consent requirements, such not
allowing users to refuse data collection or installing track-
ing and profiling cookies before the user gives explicit con-
sent [17, 37, 43, 57, 61, 62, 65]. While many researchers
have worked to detect and analyze consent notices and their
impact on the Web advertising and tracking industry after
the GDPR, no study has measured the GDPR violations of
explicit consent on mobile apps. For mobile apps, researchers
mostly focused on analyzing the app privacy policies to iden-
tify legislation violations, i.e., determining whether an app’s
behavior is consistent with what is declared in the app privacy
policy [4, 56, 58, 72, 73].
Researchers have proposed different techniques to detect
privacy violations by mobile apps and identify third-party ad-
vertising and tracking services. Many techniques have relied
on the static program analysis of app binary code to detect
malicious behaviors and privacy leaks [7, 8, 45, 48] as well
as third-party library use [9, 40, 42]. While the static analysis
techniques are well known for producing high false positives
(e.g., do not produce actual measurements of privacy viola-
tions) [12, 39, 67], the dynamic analysis shows precisely how
the app and system behave during the test (i.e., by running
the app and auditing its runtime behavior) [10, 56, 70, 71].
However, an effective dynamic analysis requires building an
instrumentation framework for possible behaviors of interest,
which involves extensive engineering effort [53]. Another
line of work aims to inspect network communications to iden-
tify third-party advertising and tracking services and privacy
leaks [13, 25, 36, 52, 55] — which is closely related to our
work. However, while prior works primarily focused on data
protected by OS permissions (e.g., GPS data), we further de-
tect potential unique identifiers which could be used to track
an individual (Section 3.2.2). We believe our work is an im-
portant first step in understanding the magnitude of violations
of GDPR consent requirements and potential causes, and can
spark further research into addressing these problems.
Research Questions Orthogonal to prior work, we aim to
understand how often GDPR’s explicit consent mandate is
violated in the mobile ecosystem, focusing on Android. To
that end, we derive a semi-automated system that allows us to
detect apps which sent out users’ personal data without prior
consent. By further analyzing the parties involved in receiving
such data, this allows us to determine which parties act as data
controllers, which require explicit consent, including specific
explanations of what the data is used for. Specifically, our
research aims at answering the following research questions:
• RQ1: How many apps send out personal data without
any prior consent? By developing a semi-automated
system to tackle this question, we analyze a dataset of
86,163 apps to detect to which hosts the apps send data
without any prior explicit consent from the user.
• RQ2: Of the apps which send out any data, how many
send it towards parties that act as data controllers under
the GDPR? By analyzing the legal documents provided
by third-party vendors, we determine which of them
unequivocally must be considered data controllers, al-
lowing us to reason about GDPR consent violations.
• RQ3: Are developers aware of the requirements of GDPR
and the issues that might arise from not following the out-
lined laws? To answer this, we notify affected develop-
ers, provide details on which parties their apps contacted
without prior consent, and survey the issues they face in
integrating third-party SDKs in a GDPR-compliant way.
2.2 Legal Background
In this work, the GDPR is used as the base for our legal analy-
sis. The GDPR governs all processing of personal data related
to individuals situated in the EU and EEA. Additionally, the
ePrivacy Directive applies to how third parties gather consent
to accessing information stored on the consumers’ device
(also known as “cookie law”), but this is outside our scope.
2.2.1 Definition of Personal Data
Under GDPR’s Article 4 [30], “personal data” (referred to
as “PD”) means any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (“data subject”). This definition
includes unique identification numbers, which may include
Advertising IDs, location data, and online identifiers (such as
IP addresses) — when they can be used to identify users over
a long period across different apps and services [4].
The definition of personal data under the GDPR is much
broader than personal identifiable data (PII) under US laws.
Instead of only including directly identifying data, GDPR also
considers personal data such data that can be used alone or
in combination to single out an individual in a data set. The
EU Court of Justice has already declared that even dynamic
IP addresses may be considered personal data in its Breyer v.
Germany ruling [2].
Android’s Advertising ID (AAID) is an interesting sub-
ject for the courts, which lacks a ruling as of yet. Google
describes the ID as “a unique, user-resettable ID for advertis-
ing, provided by Google Play services. [...]. It enables users
to reset their identifier or opt-out of personalized ads” [34].
While Google itself remained vague on characterisation of
the AAID as personal data, the IAB Europe GDPR Imple-
mentation Working Group already established in their 2017
Working Paper on personal data that “Cookies and other de-
vice and online identifiers (IP addresses, IDFA, AAID, etc.)
are explicitly called out as examples of personal data under
the GDPR” [35]. In May 2020, NOYB – European Center for
Digital Rights [46], a European not-for-profit privacy advo-
cacy group, lodged a formal complaint over the AAID with
Austria’s data protection authority. The complaint states that
although the AAID is personal data, Google does not adhere
to the requirements of valid consent. Android users have no
option to deactivate or delete the tracking ID, only to reset it
to a new one. Furthermore, even Google’s own brand Admob
explicitly lists the AAID as personal data in their documenta-
tion about the User Messaging Platform used to deliver their
ads [33]. Meanwhile, Apple has recently taken actions for
mandatory prior consent for sharing of Advertising Identi-
fiers for its iOS 14 update [6], clarifying that even dynamic
advertising identifiers are considered personal data.
2.2.2 Legal Basis for Processing of Personal Data
Under the GDPR, all processing of European residents’ per-
sonal data has to have a legal justification. App developers
(first parties) process user data in order to provide the app’s
functionalities and services. By deciding on the means and
purposes for processing the user’s personal data, they act as
data controllers, the legal role that is the responsible party
for data processing. Parties external to this app developer
(third parties) that also receive the user’s data could act in two
possible capacities. If they act purely on behalf of the first
party with no data use for their own purposes and under the
complete control of the first party (e.g., error logging), they
act as data processors. If they use the user’s data for their
own purposes and gains, i.e., in order to do market research,
create and monetize user profiles across customers or improve
their services, and are not controlled by the first party, they
act as data controllers.
GDPR Article 6 [31] contains the six general justifications
for processing. Among others, the processing may be based on
consent, the fulfillment of a contract, compliance with a legal
obligation, or the data controller’s legitimate interests when
such interest outweighs the fundamental rights and freedoms
of the data subjects. In practice, most advertising companies
rely on consent or legitimate interests as the legal basis for
processing personal data for profiling and targeted advertising
(i.e., since the legal ground necessary for the performance of
a contract does not apply in these circumstances [11, 29]).
However, a recent study from the Norwegian Consumer
Council [29] shows that data subjects do not have a clear
understanding of the amount of data sharing and the variety
of purposes their personal data is used for in targeted ads.
A large amount of personal data being sent to various third
parties, who all have their own purposes and policies for
data processing, are detrimental to the data subjects’ privacy.
Even if advertising is necessary to provide services free of
charge, these privacy violations are not strictly necessary to
provide digital ads. Consequently, it seems unlikely that these
companies’ legitimate interests may claim to outweigh the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. This
means that many of the ad tech companies would most likely
have to rely on consent as the legal basis for their processing
operations. In case the data transfer in question relies on user
consent, the GDPR requires the consent to be freely given,
specific, informed, and unambiguous. Further, the data subject
must have given consent through a statement or by a clear
affirmative action prior to the data processing in question
(GDPR Art. 4(11) [30] and Art. 7 [32]).
Unambiguous consent under the GDPR must meet certain
conditions. The GDPR Art. 7(2) states that: “If the data sub-
ject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration
which also concerns other matters, the request for consent
shall be presented in a manner which is clearly distinguish-
able from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily ac-
cessible form, using clear and plain language”. The user’s
consent has to be easily differentiated from other declarations
or even consent to other processing activities. The user has to
be specifically asked to consent to data sharing and processing
for advertising purposes and this consent must not be grouped
together with, e.g., consent to download the app or consent to
access certain APIs on the phone.
In order to be legally valid, consent with regard to the pro-
cessing of personal data has to be explicit. This means that the
controller should obtain verbal or written confirmation about
the specific processing [Recital 32]. According to the Arti-
cle 29 Working Party, consent cannot be based on an opt-out
mechanism, as the failure to opt-out is not a clear affirmative
action [49]. The user has to actively give their consent, i.e.,
by clicking “I agree” on a consent form. Merely continuing
to use an app or other passive behavior does not constitute
explicit consent. Lastly, the consent has to be obtained prior
to the data processing to be considered valid.
Our research focuses explicitly on these aspects of user
consent. In particular, with respect to the aforementioned
regulations, transmitting data to an advertisement company
without prior, explicit consent by the user for the purpose of
targeted advertisement is considered violating GDPR.
Data Type Description
AAID Android Advertising ID
BSSID Router MAC addresses of nearby hotspots
Email Email address of phone owner
GPS User location
IMEI Mobile phone equipment ID
IMSI SIM card ID
MAC MAC address of WiFi interface
PHONE Mobile phone’s number
SIM_SERIAL SIM card ID
SERIAL Phone hardware ID (serial number)
SSID Router SSIDs of nearby hotspots
GSF ID Google Services Framework ID
Table 1: Overview of personal data tied to a phone.
3 Methodology
Our main goal is to have a mostly automated and scalable so-
lution to detect personal data that is being sent to the Internet
without users’ explicit consent, as is mandated by the GDPR.
We set up an array of Android devices, on which we run each
app (without any interaction) and capture the network traffic
(Section 3.1). Based on personal data which is directly tied to
the phone (see Table 1), we automatically detect this data in
both plain and encoded form through string matching. More-
over, we derive a methodology that allows us to pinpoint data
that may be other unique identifiers and manually validate
whether this can be used to track the user/device (Section 3.2).
In the following, we outline how we conduct each of the steps
in more detail.
3.1 App Setup and Network Traffic Collection
We run each app and capture its network traffic. Here, we aim
to detect apps’ network traffic without users’ explicit consent.
To achieve this, we simply open the app but do not interact
with it at all. The underlying assumption is that if network
traffic occurs when this app is opened without any interactions,
we have naturally not consented explicitly to any type of data
collection by third parties. Hence, any data being sent out must
not be PD, so as not to violate GDPR. Orthogonal to that, in
practice, users may not grant all the apps’ permission requests,
or the app may use the runtime-permission mechanism (i.e.,
the permissions are not granted at installation time, and users
will allow/deny permission requests at runtime when using
the app). As such, it may be the case that PD (e.g., the IMEI)
can only be accessed after the user consents to API usage.
However, this API consent does not imply consent to have
sensitive data shared with third parties. Therefore, to be legally
compliant, the app must respect explicit consent even if it is
authorized to access the data through a granted permission.
Recall that our goal is to analyze apps on a large scale.
Hence, relying on static analysis techniques, which may
produce a vast amount of false positives, is not an op-
tion [12, 39, 67]. Furthermore, we aim to have a lightweight
solution to allow us to check thousands of apps in a reasonable
time. Hence heavyweight instrumentation of the app itself
is out of the question. Therefore, our approach is prone to
miss certain instances (e.g., if we are unable to detect unique
identifiers in the outgoing traffic or the app crashes in our
lightweight instrumentation).
We rely on six rooted devices (Pixels, Pixel 3a, and Nexus
5) running Android 8 or 9 to analyze a given app. To intercept
the TLS traffic, the devices are instrumented with our own
root certificate (i.e., by using MitM proxy [15]). Further, we
use objection to detect and disable SSL Pinning [47]. In the
first step of our analysis pipeline, we aim to identify apps that
send some data when started. To achieve that, we install the
app in question and grant all requested permissions listed in
the manifest, i.e., both install time and runtime permissions.
Subsequently, we launch the app and record its network traffic.
As our initial tests showed that apps sometimes did not load
on first start, we close the app and reopen it, so as to increase
the chances of observing any traffic. If an app shows no traffic
in either of these starts, we discard it from further analysis.
3.2 Traffic Log Analyzer
Under the GDPR, personal data includes the Advertising
IDs [46], location data, and online identifiers (e.g., IP ad-
dresses, any unique tracking identifiers) which can be used
to identify users over a long period, potentially across differ-
ent apps and services [4]. Next to data protected through OS
permissions (e.g., IMEI, MAC), an app may also use other
types of persisted, unique identifiers to track users. Hence,
our analysis focuses on all possibly sensitive data as well as
data that can be used to uniquely track a user or a specific
instance of the app on their phone.
3.2.1 String-Matching Device-Bound Data
The first type of data we consider is such data that is tied to the
phone, such as the location, the AAID, or the MAC address.
Since such information is accessible by apps, we extract the
relevant values from the phone through the Android debug
bridge to ensure we know these values for each phone. The
data selected for this (see Table 1) is inspired by the data used
in prior work [52, 56]. Specifically, we first use simple string
matching to identify PD that is static and known in advance.
This information includes persistent identifiers bound to the
phone (e.g., the IMEI, the MAC address of the WiFi interface,
and the AAID) and those that are otherwise sensitive, such
as the device owner’s name, email address, or phone number.
For the geolocation data, we search for the precise latitude
and longitude written as a floating-point number, and those
values are rounded to 3, 4, and 5 decimal places.
Beyond simple string-comparison, we also search for com-
mon transformations, such as upper/lower case, hashing (e.g.,
MD5, SHA-1), or encoding (e.g., base64) in our analysis.
Naturally, this may miss cases in which, e.g., a custom hash
function is used on the sensitive data by the app. To identify
such cases as well as cases in which an app creates a persis-
tent identifier itself, we conduct a second check for potential
unique tracking identifiers.
3.2.2 Potentially Unique Tracking Identifiers Detector
This step aims to identify parameters that could be used to
track and profile an individual, but do not obviously string-
match with known values such as the IMEI. We aim to cover
both cases of obfuscated usage of common identifiers as well
as those cases where the app generates a persistent identifier
and stores it locally. For example, from Android 8.0, the An-
droid ID scopes to {user, app signing key, device} that does
not obviously string-match with known identifiers.
More specifically, for a given app, we perform multiple
runs (Ri) with a different set of devices (Pi) to monitor and
record its network traffic. For each run Ri on a particular
device Pi, we first install the app in question and grant all
necessary requested permissions. While monitoring the app
network traffic, we start the app, close the app and start it
once more. By analyzing the captured traffic in run Ri, we
extract all contacted hosts (domain names) as well as the
GET and POST parameters (including parsing JSON if the
content type of the request is set accordingly). This allows
us to identify all contacted domains as well as the param-
eters and the values the app sent out. The output contains
a set of triples ti={<domain,parameter,value>}. Each triple
<domain,parameter,value> is the identified contacted domain
together with its parameter and the value that is being sent in
the run Ri by the analyzed apps.
To this end, we further define two functions: (1) di f f (ti, t j)
outputs all triplets of <domain,parameter,value> in ti for
triples that have the same domain and parameter but different
value between ti and t j; (2) the function stable(ti, t j) outputs
all triplets of parameters which remained unchanged between
two sets. Figure 2 shows an overview of our approach to
detect potential unique identifiers (which we refer to as UID
in the following). In general, four steps are involved:
1. On phone P1, we first perform a run R1 to discover all
the app’s network traffic. Then, by analyzing the R1
traffic, we identify all of the contacted domains and their
parameters (t1). If there is no data sent to the Internet by
the app (t1 = {}), no further step is required.
2. On the same phone P1, we now conduct run R2 (instal-
lation and two open/close cycles). In between the two
runs, we uninstall the app and set the time one day into
the future. The intuition here is that if an app is sending
some persistent identifier, this would be the same across
time and remain on the device (e.g., in persistent storage
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if t1 = {} then stop
c1 = stable(t1, t2)
c2 = di f f (c1, t3)
c3 =
di f f (c2,stable(t4, t5))
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Figure 2: Overview of our methodology to identify potential
UIDs. After each step, the analysis terminates if the resulting
set of candidate parameters is empty.
we analyze the traffic to extract tuples (t2). All parame-
ters which are not stable between these runs cannot be
persistent identifiers (e.g., the date) and are hence dis-
carded. Suppose an app has any parameters with stable
values across the two runs (c1 = stable(t1, t2)). In that
case, we consider a first candidate list for the next step —
otherwise, we terminate the analysis (if c1 = {}).
3. We now perform a run R3 and extract the triplets from
its traffic (t3) on a different phone P2. For each param-
eter value that remains stable across the two phones
(stable(c1, t3)), we assume the stable value is tied to the
app (such as some app-specific token) and hence discard
these. If an app has at least one parameter, for which the
value remained stable between R1 and R2 (both on P1),
but differs between R2 (P1) and R3 (P2), we consider this
app further (naturally only considering those parameters
that differed), i.e., c2 = di f f (c1, t3) 6= {}.
4. Given the diversity in our used phones, such a differ-
ence may simply be caused by the make and model or
the OS version that is being sent out. To remove such
cases, we now conduct further two runs R4 and R5, this
time on two phones with the same make and model and
OS version (Pixel 3a with Android 9). Suppose data
is stable between these two runs (stable(t4, t5) 6= {}).
In that case, we deem the corresponding parameter to
be related to the device’s make, model, or OS version,
which is not a viable tracking identifier, and hence dis-
card the entries. The outputs of the final step is then
c3 = di f f (c2,stable(t4, t5)).






Table 2: Examples of the UIDs identified by our approach.
didates for persistent identifiers (c3). In the final step, we
manually check the parameters identified in this fashion, to
ensure that they do not contain false positives. Particularly,
we removed low-entropy entries such as carriers, time zones,
or LAN IPs. Moreover, we also took into account the names
of the parameters, disregarding parameter names that did not
indicate any identifying capabilities (such as rs parameter on
helpshift.com, which has sufficient entropy but lacks the
clear indication of an identifier in its name). For our analysis,
which we present in detail in Section 4, we identified 2,113
potential parameter/domain pairs that matched the criterion
in the final stage. Of those, we discarded 412, e.g., because
they were related to the (different) carriers or install times.
Examples of different UIDs we detected this way are shown
in Table 2. That is, given an app, our pipeline can automati-
cally detect the sending of personal data (such as IMEI, IMSI,
UIDs) without users’ prior explicit consent. However, we have
to manually vet the potential UIDs to avoid false-positive re-
ports. Notably, we therefore may have missed true positives,
which we nevertheless favor over a false positive.
3.3 Limitations
Our approach naturally suffers from certain limitations, some
of which are desired. As an example, an app might show a
welcome screen unrelated to data collection consent and only
send out data once the user interacts with the app. Our frame-
work would miss such cases of incorrect consent handling.
We consciously decided to allow these false negatives, as un-
derstanding whether or not the welcome screen asks explicit
consent and opt-out is infeasible to be done automatically.
Second, it might be possible that the consent notices are
part of the runtime permissions request (e.g., apps have ratio-
nales that indicate data collection and use). By automatically
granting all apps’ permission requests, our approach might
have false positives for such cases. However, in practice, Liu
et al. [41] show that most developers do not provide rationales
for permission requests (less than 25% of apps in their study).
Moreover, before Android 6, only install-time permissions
existed, meaning that any app compatible with Android 5 or
lower could not ask for consent in the permission request. Out
of the apps that we detected to send PD (see Section 4), about
96% support Android prior to 6.
Third, given that we rely on software that attempts to by-
pass security mechanisms (in particular SSL pinning), the
apps may be able to detect such manipulation, e.g., by check-
ing which CA is the root of the trust chain. Similarly, an app
may also simply not start on a rooted device. Moreover, apps
may not be supported on the Android 8 devices, which means
they might not start and hence cannot be analyzed. Generally
speaking, all these are potential causes for false negatives.
Finally, an app may also transmit a persistent identifier in
some encrypted form with changing encryption keys or use a
custom serialization format. Naturally, this is not something
we can account for, and we would miss the parameter (as we
could not decode the serialization protocol or, in case of the
encryption case, its values already change between R1 and
R2). However, we argue that if any app is detected to send out
PD in our automated system, we have never granted explicit
consent; hence we do not suffer from false positives.
4 Large-Scale Analysis
In this section, we present the results of our empirical study
of Android apps on Google Play, with respect to the violation
of GDPR’s explicit consent mandate. We first outline which
datasets we consider and subsequently present our analysis
results. We note that all technical testing was done in Germany
where the GDPR applies, i.e., our geolocation is Germany
and the app store is set to the German variant. Based on our
findings, we manually analyze the contacted domains with
the help of a legal scholar to determine which third parties are
data controllers for which GDPR mandates explicit consent.
4.1 App Dataset Construction
Our analysis aims to assess the state of GDPR violations in
both high-profile and long-tail apps on the Play Store, and to
understand if the violations are specific to either of them. To
achieve this and compare these types of apps, we sample two
datasets, totaling 86,163 apps:
High-profile app dataset: We crawled the top free high-
profile apps in May 2020 from the Google Play store based on
the AppBrain statistic [5]. For each country and 33 categories,
AppBrain lists the top 500 apps. However, for some cate-
gories, AppBrain does not provide a full list of 500 apps (e.g.,
Events with only 271 apps). Therefore, as a result, our crawler
obtained 16,163 high-profile apps from 33 app categories.
Long-tail app dataset: Between May and September 2020,
we crawled all free Android apps available in the store from
Germany and successfully obtained more than 1 million apps.
Rather than running the analysis of the entire dataset, we de-
cided to filter the list of apps through two steps to reach a
more manageable dataset: we first rely on Exodus-Privacy
[22] to identify apps that have integrated tracking or adver-
tising libraries. As a result, we obtained more than 700,000
apps with embedded tracking or advertising libraries (304 of
which are detected by Exodus-Privacy) in their code. Of these
apps, we randomly sampled approx. 10% of apps with at least
10,000 downloads and excluded those in the high-profile set
already, yielding 70,000 distinct apps for testing.
We note that this pre-selection strategy of filtering out apps
which Exodus-Privacy did not flag as containing advertising
or tracking libraries results in a sampling bias compared to
the high-profile apps. To account for that, when comparing
the statistics later, we only compare our data against those
high-profile apps that Exodus-Privacy also flagged.
4.2 Network Traffic Analysis
As mentioned in Section 3.3, our approach suffers from cer-
tain limitations which keep us from analyzing all apps in the
dataset. We were able to successfully analyze 72,274 (83.9%)
apps, i.e., 14,975 high-profile apps and 57,299 long-tail apps.
The remaining 13,889 either crashed or detected the analysis
environment, making all of them potential false negatives.
Out of the 72,274 successfully analyzed apps, we iden-
tified 41,900 apps that contacted the Internet in either of
the launches in R1. Specifically, we identified 10,290 unique
fully-qualified domain names being contacted. However, we
found that a single registerable domain uses many subdomains
(e.g., rt.applovin.com, d.applovin.com). To normalize
these hosts to their registerable domain (applovin.com in
the above cases), we rely on the public suffix list [51]. We
refer to these resolved domains as domain names in the fol-
lowing. As a result, we identified 7,384 domain names that
were contacted by 41,900 apps.
Among the 7,384 domain names, we found 1,744 (23,6%)
domain names that received one or more of the types of PD
listed in Table 1. Each time any of the relevant data is sent
by an app to a domain, we count this as a case of PD being
sent out. Specifically, we identified 28,665 apps (see the first
column of Table 3) that sent PD to these 1,744 domain names.
We now rely on the assumption that a third party would serve
multiple apps and hence flag those domains as third-party
domains that are contacted by at least ten different apps. This
leads us to detect 337 distinct third-party domains. We found
that 28,065 (97.9% of 28,665; second column in Table 3)
apps sent PD to 209 third-party domains. Notably, third-party
domains, representing only 12.0% of domains which received
PD, are responsible for a disproportionate fraction (94,7%)
of cases of receiving PD without prior consent.
This result suggests that only a negligible number of first
parties collect PD. In contrast, the majority of PD was sent to
third parties, which developers heavily rely on for a variety of
purposes such as monetization (e.g., personalized ads), error
logging, analytic services, user engagement, or social network
integration. We note that GDPR mandates explicit consent in
case such a third party acts as a data controller (rather than
a data processor, that does not itself benefit from processing
the data). Hence, in the following, we specifically focus on
domains for which we can unequivocally determine that they







High-Profile Apps Long-Tail Apps High-Profile Apps Long-Tail Apps High-Profile Apps Long-Tail Apps
AAID 5,177 (34.6 %) 22,152 (38.7 %) 5,072 (33.9 %) 21,957 (38.3 %) 4,366 (29.2 %) 19,904 (34.7 %)
BSSID 86 (0.6 %) 107 (0.2 %) 71 (0.5 %) 88 (0.2 %) 16 (0.1 %) 12 (0.0 %)
EMAIL 48 (0.3 %) 113 (0.2 %) 42 (0.3 %) 108 (0.2 %) — —
GPS 459 (3.1 %) 1,151 (2.0 %) 363 (2.4 %) 946 (1.7 %) 136 (0.9 %) 244 (0.4 %)
GSF 4 (0.0 %) 3 (0.0 %) 3 (0.0 %) 1 (0.0 %) — —
IMEI 107 (0.7 %) 611 (1.1 %) 51 (0.3 %) 444 (0.8 %) 36 (0.2 %) 356 (0.6 %)
IMSI 22 (0.1 %) 26 (0.0 %) 8 (0.1 %) 6 (0.0 %) — —
MAC 68 (0.5 %) 126 (0.2 %) 30 (0.2 %) 41 (0.1 %) 27 (0.2 %) 17 (0.0 %)
PHONE 1 (0.0 %) 4 (0.0 %) 1 (0.0 %) — — —
SERIAL 49 (0.3 %) 158 (0.3 %) 17 (0.1 %) 91 (0.2 %) 3 (0.0 %) 3 (0.0 %)
SIM_SERIAL 9 (0.1 %) 29 (0.1 %) 5 (0.0 %) 19 (0.0 %) — —
SSID 73 (0.5 %) 108 (0.2 %) 67 (0.4 %) 78 (0.1 %) 17 (0.1 %) 15 (0.0 %)
UID 1,044 (7.0 %) 4,471 (7.8 %) 938 (6.3 %) 4,236 (7.4 %) 679 (4.5 %) 3,533 (6.2 %)
Any 5,455 (36.4%) 23,210 (40.5%) 5,276 (35.2%) 22,789 (39.8%) 4,415 (29.5%) 20,423 (35.6%)
Table 3: Types of data and number of apps sending this to any, third-party, and ad domains (percentages relative to dataset sizes).
4.3 Identifying Advertisement Domains
Under the GDPR, all personal data processing has to have a
legal justification. The first party acting as a data controller
may rely on several potential legal justifications for their data
processing: fulfillment of a contract, legitimate interest, or
consent. This legal justification extends to any third party
acting as a data processor for the app developer. Since the
third party acts completely under the app developer’s control
they are viewed as in the same legal domain as the first party.
Meanwhile, a third party acting as a data controller would
need its own legal justification to receive and process the
user’s PD. As such, they cannot rely on the original controller
(app developer) to be the only responsible party to obtain a
valid legal basis for their processing operations, or to ensure
compliance with other obligations under the GDPR, particu-
larly regarding the exercise of data subjects’ rights. [29].
As the most prominent business case of third parties receiv-
ing and processing user data for their own business purposes,
we chose (targeted) advertising to have a conservative lower
bound for the cases of GDPR violations in the wild. An app
which relies on external data controllers for targeted adver-
tising needs to explicitly ask for the user’s consent to share
her PD with the third party. We found that third-party do-
mains received 94,7% of all PD being sent out to the Internet.
In order to analyze whether this data transfer would most
likely require the user’s prior consent, we first need to identify
whether a third party is an advertising company, and second
need to differentiate between those third parties that act as
data processors and those that act as data controllers.
To determine whether a party is a potential advertisement
company, we first rely on Webshrinker’s categorization to
identify the main topic of a domain [68] for all 209 third-
party domains that received PD in our analysis. For all do-
mains not flagged as ad-related, we manually review the Web
pages of the domains to assess if the domain is related to a
company offering in-app advertising services. For example,
while Facebook is categorized by Webshrinker as a social net-
work, they are also an advertising company, which relies on
graph.facebook.com for advertising and tracking [52]. In
this fashion, we identified 69 domains which are operated by
ad-related companies. However, not all these domains actually
act as data controllers under the GDPR. To distinguish be-
tween data controllers and processors, we analyzed the legal
documents provided by the third parties.
Particularly, we manually analyzed the terms of service,
privacy policies, developer guidelines and contracts, if avail-
able. The GDPR requires companies processing personal data
to transparently provide their processing purposes and justi-
fication. We relied on the third party’s legal self-assessment
whether they describe themselves and their data use as a data
controller or data processor. If they described their data use
as mainly for their own company’s gain, e.g., assembling and
selling user profiles across several different apps, we would
classify them as data controllers. If they limit their described
data use as purely on behalf of and instructed by the app de-
veloper and if they would provide the additional necessary
data processor agreement documents, we classify them as data
processors. If a company’s legal statements were too vague
or they offered services as both data controller and processor,
we classified them as data processors in order to conserva-
tive estimate the number of potential GDPR violations and to
not unjustly notify app developers that commissioned these
companies as data processors.
Out of 69 third-party domains which are operated by ad-
related companies, we identified 45 domains of data con-
trollers (full list in Appendix, Table 5), which would require
explicit consent to receive data. In the next section, based on
these 45 ad-related domains, we present our analysis on the
GDPR compliance of apps regarding consent requirements.
4.4 In-Depth Analysis of Violations
We now focus on the set of apps which contacted any of the
aforementioned 45 domains which we determined to be ad-
related data controllers. Based on these domains, we find that
the vast majority of apps that contact third parties with PD in
fact send this to ad-related domains (24,838/28,065 or 88.5%,
as shown in the third column of Table 3). Moreover, 86.6%
(24,838/28,665) of apps which sent out any data do so towards
advertisement domains. Relative to the number of apps we
could successfully analyze, this means that 34.4% of them
sent out PD to third-party data controllers, thereby violating
GDPR’s mandated consent to such collection. We note that
this is in light of a mere 45/1,774 (2.5%) contacted domains
being flagged as advertisement domains, which shows the
significant skew towards apps sending out PD to advertise-
ment companies without user’s explicit prior consent. No-
tably, there is a significant skew towards the AAID as being
the most frequently transferred piece of PD. However, accord-
ing to both the advertising industry [35] and Google’s own
brand [33], the AAID is considered PD and regularly requires
consent before being collected by third-party data controllers.
Identifying Major Players We now turn to analyze which
are the most frequent parties that receive PD. Figure 3 shows
the top 10 ad-related domains that received PD in our dataset,
counting the number of apps that sent data towards them. We
find that more than half of the apps which sent data without
consent sent data to (at least) Facebook. It is noteworthy that
Facebook makes GDPR compliance particularly tough for
developers to implement. According to their own documenta-
tion [23], their SDK defaults to assuming user consent. That
is, a developer must actively disable the automated transmis-
sion of PD and implement their own consent dialogue. In the
case of Facebook, they operate in multiple capacities (e.g.,
social media integration and advertisement), yet their terms
allow data sharing between the different services in their pri-
vacy policies. Specifically, the Facebook Graph API can share
its data with Facebook Ads [4], which in turn can again be
used to optimize advertisement.
The current version of the SDK of the second most-
prevalent recipient of data, namely Unity, supports two vari-
ants of consent [63]: either, the developer provides consent
through an API call (naturally after having acquired explicit
consent) or the app developer can rely on Unity’s solution
which asks the user when the first ad is shown. However, as
per their legal documentation, this is an opt-out mechanism
rather than opt-in [64]. We believe this to be the major driving
force behind the large number of requests towards Unity, as
their ads first transmit data and then ask users to opt-out.
As for the third-largest recipient, we note that Flurry also
supports a consent API, but the documentation is unclear
about the default behavior and lacks important details about
the proper implementation [26]. More notably, Flurry dele-





























Figure 3: Top 10 ad domains that frequently received PD from
24,838 apps that sent PD to all ad-related domains.
gates the responsibility to acquire consent to the app developer.
Moreover, they explicitly state that they assume any data is
only sent after the developer has received consent. Overall,
this implies that library providers make it very cumbersome
for developers to be compliant with GDPR.
Combining Multiple Identifiers As our data indicates, the
vast majority of apps send out the AAID. While this in itself is
already problematic with respect to the GDPR, apps sending
out any other information alongside the AAID also violate
the Google policy for AAID usage. In particular, according
to said policy [3, 50], the AAID must only be used for ad-
vertising and user analytics. For both purposes, the AAID
may not be connected to persistent device identifiers (e.g.,
SSID, IMEI). The AAID may only be connected to other
personally-identifiable information with the user’s explicit
consent. In our dataset, we found that a total of 3,840 apps
combined the AAID with some other type of personal infor-
mation. Hence, all these apps not only infringe on the explicit
consent required by GDPR, but also violate Google’s policy,
which means they could be removed from the app store.
For each app, we investigated to which ad-related domain
they sent out the combination of the AAID and other PD.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. Note that,
on purpose, we do not include the UID here, as we cannot
identify whether a particular unique ID is just the AAID (e.g.,
hashed with an unknown algorithm). The results indicate that
there are numerous domains that receive the combination of
AAID and some other identifiers. Specifically, for cases such
as the 190 apps that sent out the AAID with the IMEI to Flurry,
Google can remove the apps without prior notice from the app
store. To further understand this violation of Google’s policy
(combined with the fact that only relatively few apps conduct
this practice), we analyzed the versions of SDKs used in apps
which sent out the data to these top 5 ad-related domains. To
that end, we rely on a two-step approach. First, based on the
collected traffic, we identify SDK version numbers from the
requests, such as GET or POST parameters (see Appendix B
for details). For apps which lack such version information in
the HTTP traffic, we instead rely on a more involved analysis















Table 4: Top 5 of ad domains receiving AAID along with
other PD in our two app datasets.
through LibScout [9]. We chose not to apply LibScout to all
apps given the significant runtime overhead this would have
caused (99.47 seconds per app for 100 randomly tested apps
on macOS/Core-i7/16GB RAM).
Out of the 353 apps which contacted Flurry, we were unable
to extract SDK version information for 202 apps from their
traffic. For these 202 apps, LibScout successfully detected
SDK versions for 53 of the apps. In particular, it detected
SDK versions for 45 of the 190 apps which sent the IMEI,
all of which were pre-GDPR versions. We note that based
on the release notes of Flurry [28], the feature for the IMEI
collection was removed already in 2016. Since we are unable
to download Flurry SDKs before version 6.2.0 (released in
November 2015), it is highly likely that LibScout’s failure to
detect the version stems from pre-6.2.0 versions being used
by the apps in question. Hence, we believe that the IMEI
collection can be attributed to extremely old versions of the
SDK still in use in the apps we tested. For the versions which
sent the serial, LibScout detected two out of the four SDK
versions, both of which ran pre-GDPR versions. For the single
detected case of sending out the MAC address, LibScout
detected a version with GDPR support. Finally, for the class
of apps that sent out GPS, we could detect SDK versions
for 151/156 based on the traffic, and LibScout successfully
detected the SDK version for the remaining five. Notably, all
these apps used current versions of the Flurry SDK. However,
based on the Flurry manual, it appears that if an app has
GPS permissions, Flurry defaults to sending this unless the
developer explicitly opts-out [27].
For the 42 cases in which my.com received (at least)
the MAC with the AAID, we found that 23 ran SDK ver-
sions which support GDPR. However, the documentation
is sparse [44] and it remains unclear if the default behav-
ior is to collect such data (or the developer has to set
setUserConsent to true first). For the remaining 19 cases,
they all used outdated SDK versions without GDPR support.
Considering the data sent out to Amazon, we find that 20/30
apps are running a current version of the Mobile Ads SDK.
For the 29 cases of apps which sent the AAID along with the
IMEI to Unity, these all used outdated SDKs (released before
2018 when GDPR came into effect). For Vungle, 16/26 apps
which sent out GPS with the AAID ran pre-GDPR versions
of the library (added in version 6.2.5 [66]). Yet, for the re-
maining ten, the version numbers indicated GDPR support;
i.e., in these cases developers opted into sending said data.
Further, out of 24,838 apps that sent PD to ad-related do-
mains, we found that 2,082 (8.4%) of these apps have a pre-
GDPR update date (before May 2018). We note from this
analysis that the most egregious violations can be attributed
both to extremely old versions of libraries (e.g., developers
often neglect SDK updates when adding functionality [18]),
but also to the complex configuration required to make apps
GDPR (and Play Store)-compliant. This is particularly obvi-
ous for the collected GPS coordinates in Flurry’s SDK, which
seems to be enabled by default unless developers opt-out. In
the following, we aim to understand if the violations discussed
thus far are specific to either high-profile or long-tail apps.
Comparing the Datasets A natural question that arises is
about potential differences between the datasets. As men-
tioned earlier, we filtered the long-tail apps through Exodus-
Privacy, which introduces a selection bias. To account for that,
before comparing the datasets, we apply the same filtering to
the high-profile apps. After that, we find that only 10,799 of
the 14,975 high-profile apps we could successfully analyze
would have passed this filtering step. Notably, we would have
missed 888 high-profile apps which sent out data if we had
prefiltered the high-profile apps. Assuming similar distribu-
tions of undetected ad-related libraries in the long-tail set, this
is an obvious limitation of our sampling approach and should
be kept in mind for future work. After applying the filtering to
the high-profile set, we consider 3,527/10,799 (32.6%) high-
profile apps which sent out data as well as 20,423/57,299
(35.6%) apps from the long-tail dataset in the following.
We first compare the number of apps in each dataset which
send out PD to ad-related domains. Our null hypothesis H0 is
that there is no difference between high-profile and long-tail
apps in terms of sending out PD. By applying χ2, we find that
with p < 0.01, H0 is rejected. However, computing Cramer’s
V (v = 0.0228) we find that the effect is negligible [20]. Next,
we investigate to what extent the apps in the datasets differ in
terms of domains to which they send PD. For this, we apply
the Kruskal-Wallis test, which rejects H0 of no difference
between the sets with p< 0.01; however, computing the effect
size ε2 = 0.0178, there is again only a small to negligible
effect [20]. Similarly, for the number of different types of PD
sent out, Kruskal-Wallis shows p = 0.022, but ε2 = 0.0002,
i.e., again significant difference, yet negligible effect.
In addition to the overall trend, we also analyzed whether
we can observe differences in the parties which are contacted
by apps in each category. Figure 4 shows the most frequently



























Figure 4: Top 5 ad domains receiving PD in each app set after
applying the Exodus-Privacy filtering to the high-profile set
(percentages relative to the PD-sending apps per dataset).
contacted domains across both datasets together with the per-
centage of apps that sent PD to them. In particular, we con-
sider the percentages relative to the apps after the Exodus
filtering step. We note that facebook.com is the most preva-
lent in both sets, yet occurs more often in the high-profile than
the long-tail apps. Contrary to that, we find that unity3d.com
is more pronounced in the long-tail apps.
By analyzing the categories of the apps, we found that
Unity is frequently used in games, which are at the core of
Unity’s business model. Notably, AppBrain combines all sub-
categories of games into a single category, meaning our high-
profile apps set contains only 500 such games. In contrast, in
the long-tail apps set, almost 20% of the apps are related to
games, explaining the significant skew towards Unity in that
dataset. Generally, out of 72,274 successfully analyzed apps,
the top 5 categories that have more violating apps than others
in both app sets are game (73.29%), comics (64.97%), social
(41.39%), shopping (37.04%), and weather (36.59%).
Overall, the results of our comparative analysis lead us to
conclude that the phenomenon of sending out personal data
without prior explicit consent occurs as frequently and with as
many parties in both high-profile and long-tail apps. While we
did observe statistically significant differences, the associated
effect size was negligible. And while there certainly exists a
difference between the two datasets in terms of who receives
data, we cannot observe a difference that would warrant the
hypothesis that high-profile apps violate GDPR less than long-
tail ones.
Manually Analyzing Consent Dialogues To investigate
whether developers may have merely misunderstood the con-
cept of consent (or the GDPR requirements thereof), we ran-
domly sampled 100 apps which sent out data in our exper-
iment and checked the screenshots (which we had taken as
part of our analysis to show on the Web interface). Specifi-
cally, we checked for both implicit consent dialogues (such
as those indicating that by using the app, we consent to data
being sent out) or explicit opt-out dialogues. We note here
that even having an opt-out dialogue which – after negative
confirmation – stops collecting of data still meant the app
sent out data before asking for the user’s consent. Among
these 100 apps, we found only 25 apps present any type of
consent notices to users. Of these, only 11 apps provide an
option to reject the data collection, while the remaining 14
apps ask users to accept the data collection to use without
options to reject the data collection and sharing. Overall, this
indicates that the vast majority of apps do not even attempt to
achieve GDPR compliance, nor do they add meaningful ways
of rejecting consent after the fact.
5 Developer Notification
In addition to the technical analyses described thus far, we
also notified affected developers. This had two main goals:
first, to inform them about the potential breach of GDPR
regulations, which may lead to severe fines [16]. Second, we
wanted to gain insights into the underlying reasons that caused
the observed phenomena in the first place. Since disclosing
the findings to authorities (e.g., regulators, Google) might
cause financial harm to developers, we consciously decided
not to involve authorities but rather notify developers directly
to remedy compliance issues. We note that our institution’s
ethics guidelines do not mandate approval for such a study.
To notify the developers, we extracted the email addresses
used to upload the apps into the Play Store. To assess how
many developers actually received our reports, rather than
including the technical details about the issues in the email,
we sent developers a link to our web interface. On this, we
briefly explained our methodology of testing and showed the
developers information about which hosts received which type
of data (see the previous section). In addition, in our email,
we asked recipients if they had been aware of the potential
violation of their apps, their general understanding of what
is personal data under GDPR, and their plans to address the
issues as well as proposals for tool support (see Appendix A
for the full email). We decided to have this rather than a
full-fledged survey, as we wanted to keep the overhead for
respondents as low as possible to prompt more responses. We
note that the notification was carefully worded not to make
legally conclusive statements, since this could amount to legal
consulting which is strictly regulated by German law.
5.1 Notification and Accessed Reports
Out of the 24,838 apps for which we had discovered some
potential GDPR issue, 7,043 had been removed from the Play
Store by the time we conducted our notification. For the re-
maining 17,795 apps, we sent out notifications in two batches,
each with a reminder. The first batch of apps were notified
on December 15, 2020, with a reminder on January 5, 2021.
In this batch, we only included such apps that had not been
updated since our download from the Play Store until the
day of the notification, totalling 8,006 apps. We took this
step to ensure that we would not notify developers who had
removed the problematic code between our dataset down-
load and notification date. For these 9,789 apps with recent
changes, we re-downloaded the latest version, conducted our
analysis again to confirm our findings, and added those apps
to the second batch which still had some issues. The second
batch of notifications was sent on January 6, 2021, with re-
minders on January 20, 2021. Note that we decided to give an
additional week between notification and reminder for round
1 of the notifications, given the overlap with the Christmas
vacation. In both cases, we grouped emails to developers (i.e.,
if a single developer had more than one app in the store, they
only received one email with multiple links). We followed
best practices established by prior work [19, 38, 59, 60] al-
lowing developers to opt-out and not send reminders for those
apps for which we had previously seen an access to the report.
In total, we notified 11,914 developers responsible for
17,795 apps. Of those developers, eight asked to be removed
from our experiment. Until February 1, 2021, we saw 2,199
accessed reports. Notably, some accesses were related to spam
checking (e.g., from Barracuda’s IP range or clients not down-
loading subresources like CSS files), which we ignore in our
analysis. This leaves us with accessed reports for 2,083 apps.
Notably, considering that a single owner may have multiple
apps affected by the same issue, we count the overall number
of apps for which their developer accessed some report, to-
talling 2,791 (15.7%) apps for which we reached their owner.
5.2 Developer Responses
In addition to the accessed reports and the updated apps, we
also analyzed the responses we received from developers. In
total, this amounted to 448 distinct senders that we classified
emails for. Based on an initial set of responses, three coders
developed an initial code book and then separately analyzed
the entire set of responses. For all cases in which their assess-
ment of an email/thread differed, they discussed the cases in
a group until they agreed on a classification. Note that not all
respondents answered the stated questions from our email 1.
Of the 448 respondents, 114 acknowledged receipt of our
email and wanted to take it under advisement. 54 stated that
they required further investigation, either within their respec-
tive companies or their third-party SDK vendor. 48 further
inquired with us about potential solutions to the problem, such
as adding privacy policies to explain the data collection. We
faithfully answered these emails while stating that we cannot
provide conclusive individual legal assessments. Notably, 20
respondents argued that the EU was not their main market,
and that hence either GDPR would not apply to them or they
did not feel the need to implement consent, either being un-
aware of their app being downloadable from an EEA country
Play Store or that having users resident in the EU leads to
applicability of the GDPR.
1All developers we quote in this paper have given their explicit consent.
On the other side of the spectrum, 116 respondents dis-
agreed with our assessment. These ranged from comments
like “i am not aware that my app might not be GDPR com-
pliant”, “I show my privacy policy at the start of the app”,
“where seems to be the problem” to simple claims that their
apps do not transmit any user information, but also argued that
their advertisement libraries first ask for user consent before
transmitting any data. This highlights a misconception that
having a privacy policy supersedes the need to have explicit
consent under the GDPR. Notably, as also highlighted by
our manual analysis, many ad-related libraries sent out data
before showing the consent dialogue. In the most extreme
cases, developers also argued that it was infeasible for them
to fully support GDPR, with one developer stating: “I haven’t
done anything wrong in my eyes. I show adverts in my Apps
from BIG F****** COMPANIES like Google and Facebook
and it’s up to them to tell developers what they collect so we
can then pass that on to our users. Like how the hell am I
supposed to know what a black box SDK from Google does
with data in the App I publish to people???”.
When asked about the data collection, 70/151 respondents
(46%) said they were aware of the types of data being col-
lected and 53/122 (43%) said they knew this data was pro-
tected by GDPR. Of the 139 respondents who answered our
question regarding reasons for lacking explicit consent, 66
(47%) argued they rely on a third-party app builder or SDK to
make their apps compliant and 40 (29%) believed their app to
be compliant already. Ten explained their app was outdated,
seven noted that they lacked resources for proper implementa-
tion, and seven said this was a bug. Finally, nine respondents
stated there was no particular reason.
When asked about their plans to change their apps (218
answers), 136 (62%) stated to update their app, with another
29 (13%) claiming to plan to remove the app from the Play
Store altogether or make it inaccessible from EEA countries.
Eleven said to conduct additional research into GDPR and
their responsibilities as the developers, and 17 said they did
not feel the necessity to take any steps. Our data is heavily
skewed towards those developers that plan to take action; we
attribute this to the fact that developers that disagreed with
our assessment rarely answered our follow-up questions.
Regarding our final question about developer support, we
received 72 answers. Of those, 44 wanted to have an auto-
mated tool like ours to analyze their apps for compliance,
while 19 asked for better documentation around how to im-
plement GDPR compliance. Finally, nine respondents argued
that third-party tools should be compliant by default (e.g.,
“requiring ad providers to take responsibility for all the compli-
ance to this unnecessarily complicated law”). Naturally, the
skew towards automated tooling is not surprising, given that
we notified developers after applying our automated toolchain.
It is noteworthy, though, that fewer developers answered this
final question, implying that it is not even clear to them how
they could be better supported in this particular issue space.
5.3 Updates to Notified Apps
To assess our notification’s impact on the affected apps, we
downloaded new versions of all apps that had looked at our
reports at least one by April 06, 2021. We re-ran our pipeline
for each app with an updated version to assess if the changes
were related to the reported GDPR infringement. For the 2,791
apps for which we reached a developer (i.e., they looked at at
least one report for their apps), 91 apps were removed from
Google Play, and 8 apps were no longer available to download
from Germany. We found 1,075 apps with updates since our
notification for the remaining apps. By rerunning our pipeline
on these 1,075 apps, we observed that 250 (23%) apps no
longer sent PD to ad-related domains without prior consent.
Considering those 136 respondents that claimed to plan to up-
date their apps to incorporate proper GDPR consent, we found
that 92 apps (for which the respondents were responsible) had
been updated until the end of our experiment. Notably, though,
only 43 were updated in such a fashion that they did not send
out any data without interaction.
We note here that the overall number of apps which ad-
dressed the issue is low. Based on the responses we received,
we believe this to have two core reasons. First, many apps
are developed by small teams (if not individuals) who would
rather focus on functionality updates. Second, as shown in
our analysis of popular SDKs such as the one from Facebook,
they do not provide a consent dialogue, but rather put the
burden on the developer to integrate a new UI to ask for con-
sent, which is then passed to the SDK. Hence, we believe the
number of apps which address this issue will rise over time
and the seemingly small change in overall numbers can be
attributed to a lack of time to properly address the issue.
6 Calls to Action
Our results thus far have shown that the sharing of PD with
third-party data controllers is very pronounced in the datasets
we tested. More than one-third of all apps we tested sent out
PD before any users’ interaction. More notably, we could not
find a significant difference between high-profile and long-tail
apps, i.e., the problem affects both high-profile and long-tail
apps. Given these insights, we now discuss which involved
parties can take which steps to remedy the situation.
6.1 Third Parties Should Take Responsibility
Today, digital content is largely funded by advertising, which
means that companies monetize our behavior, attention, and
PD rather than us paying for services with money [29]. To
maximize revenue, advertising services heavily rely on con-
tinuous data collection and tracking PD from users [43]. Our
results show a significant skew towards apps sending out PD
to advertisement companies without user’s explicit prior con-
sent (i.e., 86.6% of all apps that sent PD to the Internet) —
which is the most prominent business case of third parties
receiving and processing user data for their own business pur-
poses. However, we found that these third parties make it
cumbersome for developers to comply with GDPR or shift
the responsibility to app developers.
For example, Facebook required developers to obtain users’
consent before sending data via the SDK [23], whereas the
default behavior is automatically collecting user PD such
as AAID [24]. Our insights further show that such popular
companies play key roles in the widespread receiving of PD
without users’ explicit consent, i.e., more than half of apps that
sent data without consent sent it to (at least) Facebook. How-
ever, many developers believed that their apps are compliant
by default when using these popular companies’ services, as
noted by one respondent as “These third party SDKs are from
industry leading ad networks that only accept those apps that
are GDPR compliant. So a GDPR compliance is must before
the app is being approved by these advertising networks (i.e.
Facebook & Admob). So our app is a GDPR complaint” (sic).
In addition, some respondents claimed to be aware of GDPR-
relevant data, but were surprised by our reports which showed
that the SDKs collected information; “We were already aware
of this topic and we were already working on it. We did not
send any events to Facebook (we eliminated this feature long
ago) – the SDK itself sent out data to Facebook without any
trigger from our side”. While this lack of knowledge does
not absolve the first party of their responsibility, the lack of
clear guidelines and safe defaults for GDPR-compliant data
collection by the advertisement industry inevitably puts their
customers, i.e., the app developers, at risk of the draconian
fines which can be imposed for GDPR violations [29].
Our findings show the urgent need for advertisement com-
panies and third parties (data controllers) to make comprehen-
sive changes to help app developers comply with European
regulations and exercise the data subjects’ fundamental rights
and freedoms. Particularly, third parties first should limit the
data collection to respect principles of data protection by
design and by default. For obtaining user consent, third par-
ties should provide the consent mechanism that automatically
shows the consent dialogue to users and explicitly ask for
opt-in to data sharing and collection, without forcing the de-
velopers to implement this mechanism in a legally compliant
way. Further, to support developers, third parties should make
their documentation transparent and easy to access, including
explicit discussions of implications of violating GDPR.
6.2 App Stores Should Take Actions
App stores such as Google Play are a channel for the distribu-
tion of developers’ apps to the users, which play an important
role in supporting developers to be informed about each terri-
tory’s related regulations and protect user privacy. However,
we found that developers lack such support, e.g., “This game
was designed to Brazil and we published the game to Europe
in March 2019 to expand our potencial [sic] customers, tar-
geting Portugal. GooglePlay allows this, checking a button,
without any restrictions. So, I feel protected by Google some-
how”. Therefore, we strongly suggest that app stores should
take more decisive actions in this area. For example, when
developers upload their apps, the store should tell them about
the selected countries’ associate regulations.
Besides a large number of apps that sent PD to ad-related
domains without users’ explicit consent (24,838 apps), we
further detected a total of 3,840 apps that combined the AAID
with some other type of PD. Hence, all these apps not only
infringe on the explicit consent required by GDPR, but also
violate Google’s policy [3, 50]. Such behaviors happened due
to developers’ opt-in or the usage of outdated libraries that do
not support GDPR. Given that, app stores could also employ
such techniques as our to identify the potential violations of
GDPR explicit consent, or the usage of outdated SDK by or
LibScout [9], and then inform developers before delivering
the apps to end-users. To support this effort, we make our
analysis pipeline available as open-source [1].
6.3 Support for Developers
Obviously developers play a major role in making their apps
compliant with the GDPR. Our findings show that they are
currently put in a disadvantaged position. Out of the responses
we received, more than half noted that they were unaware of
what counts as personal data under GDPR. From the received
responses, there is a clear need for better information and
documentation as well as tools which help developers avoid
such pitfalls. Further, based on our in-depth analysis of third
party’s developer and legal documentation, we observed that
third parties make it cumbersome for developers to comply
with GDPR. We therefore strongly call on third-party vendors
for better documentation and transparency in legal documents,
which should in turn be thoroughly checked by developers
when building their apps.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we performed an empirical study of 86,163
Android apps to understand the current state of the violation of
GDPR’s explicit consent. Doing so, we found 24,838 (34.3%
of the successfully analyzed) apps sent personal data towards
advertisement providers that act as data controllers without
the user’s explicit prior consent. We believe that our results
shed new light on the current state of the violation of GDPR’s
explicit consent in the wild. Based on our insights from our
notifications and in-depth analysis, we find that this problem
is widespread, misunderstood among developers, and requires
effort from ad providers, app stores, and developers alike to
mitigate. Finally, we derived concrete recommendations to all
concerned parties and make an urgent call to help developers
comply with the GDPR and honor users’ rights and freedoms.
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A Email Notification Template
Dear $developer team,
We are a team of academic researchers from the $af-
filiation, conducting a research project on user consent and
GDPR (EU General Data Protection Regulation) compliance
of mobile apps. Please note that this email is part of an
academic research project and is not meant to sell any
products or services.
As part of our analysis, we investigate the sharing of users’
personal information (e.g., user IP address, persistent identi-
fiers, tracking identifiers) with third-party services to show
personalized or behavioral advertising. Based on our analysis,
your app shares some personal user information to such ser-
vices without obtaining prior explicit consent from users. We
have prepared a detailed report on the analysis methodology,
the data being sent out, and the parties involved. You can
access this through our (password-protected) Web interface at
$report_url (please do not publish this URL as it is personal-
ized for your app). By analyzing the legal documents (e.g., the
terms of service, privacy policies, developer guidelines, and
contracts) provided by the third-party services in question,
we concluded that your app might be non-compliant with
the consent requirements by the GDPR [1]. In most cases,
in order to be legally compliant, an app is required to obtain
explicit consent from users situated in the European Union
before sharing users’ personal data with third parties for per-
sonalized ads, if those third parties act as a data controller.
Please note that we do not offer a conclusive legal assessment
or consultancy on an individual app’s compliance as there
might be an alternative lawful basis present for data sharing
with a third party other than consent. As this email is part
of a research project in which we are trying to understand
the reasons for GDPR compliance issues of mobile apps in
the wild, it would be immensely helpful to provide us with
feedback regarding your apps.
(1) Were you aware of the types of data that are being col-
lected and transmitted when you include third-party SDK(s)
into your apps? Were you aware that these types of data could
be considered personal data under the GDPR?
(2) Are there specific reasons why your app does not im-
plement explicit consent?
(3) Are there any changes you plan to apply to remedy the
outlined issues? What type of support (e.g., documentation or
automated tools) would be beneficial for you?
Should you have further questions or wish not to receive
any further communication, please contact us, and we will
diligently follow the request.
Best regards
$researchers
[1] (The full-text reference of [54] was added in the email.)
B Manual Version Analysis
We first analyze the app network traffic to find parameters that
indicate the SDK version. These are: unity3d.com (x-unity-
version, sdkversion, sdk_version_name, sdk_ver, sdkversion);
flurry.com (fl.sdk.version.code); vungle.com (user-agent,
sdk); my.com: (mytracker_ver); amazon-adsystem.com
(adsdk). Further, we manually verify the results with the iden-
tified SDK(s) release notes. We then used this knowledge to
detect versions all apps that sent PD.
No. Name Domain Names GDPR Solution Earliest consentsupport SDK version Note
1 Facebook facebook.com Do not require consent — Under GDPR, developer are re-
quired to obtain end User consent
before sending data via our SDK
2 Unity unity3d.com Consent API 3.3.0
3 Flurry flurry.com Consent API 10.0.0
4 AppsFlyer appsflyer.com Do not require consent — Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
5 Chartboost chartboost.com Consent API 7.3.0
6 SuperSonic supersonicads.com Consent API 6.7.9
7 StartApp startappservice.com Consent API 1.2.0
8 AdColony adcolony.com Consent API 3.3.4
9 Branch branch.io Do not require consent — Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
10 Vungle vungle.com Consent API 6.2.5
11 Applovin applovin.com Consent API 8.0.1
12 Tapjoy tapjoy.com Consent API 11.12.2 GDPR-compliant based on "legiti-
mate interest"
13 ConsoliAds consoliads.com Consent API —
13 BidMachine bidmachine.io Consent API 1.3.0
14 MoPub mopub.com Consent API 5.0.0
15 Presage presage.io — —
16 AdinCube adincube.com — —
17 Ogury ogury.io Consent API 4.1.4
18 Amazon amazon-adsystem.com —
19 InMobi inmobi.com Consent API 7.1.0
20 Adbrix ad-brix.com Do not require consent — Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
21 Adbrix adbrix.io Do not require consent — Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
22-23 Tenjin tenjin.com, tenjin.io Do not require consent - Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
24 Mobvista rayjump.com — —
25 Tenjin tenjin.io — —
26 Appnext appnext.com Consent API 2.3.0
27 Pollfish pollfish.com Do not require consent — Have to provide disclosure for using
this SDK
28 My.com my.com — —
29 Soomla soom.la Consent API — Should be a bad practice since de-
fault behavior is TRUE
30 Localytics localytics.com Do not require consent 2.1.0 Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
31 Tapdaq tapdaq.com Consent API 6.2.2
32 Leanplum leanplum.com Do not require consent - Providing APIs for opt-in and opt-
out
33 Criteo criteo.com Consent Management Provider 3.7.0
34 WebEngage webengage.com —
35 Smart AdServer smartadserver.com Consent Management Provider 1.2.0
36 Umeng umeng.com — —
37 omtrdc.net omtrdc.net — —
38 MobiRoller mobiroller.com — —
39 Kiip kiip.me not clear — Due to GDPR regulations,
NinthDecimal is now blocking
all ad requests from the affected
EEA regions.
40 Adtrace adtrace.io Do not require consent - Have to provide disclosure for using
this SDK
41 Airpush airpush.com — —
42 Inloco inlocomedia.com Consent API 4.0.0
43 PubMatic pubmatic.com — —
44 Tapstream tapstream.com — —
45 YovoAds yovoads.com — —
Table 5: Companies detected as ad-related, for which our analysis of legal documents indicate they act as data controllers.
